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THINKING WITHOUT HEIDEGGER?
Abstract: There has been a  resurgence of Martin Heidegger’s ideas in recent years, 
especially within English-language philosophy of education. Yet, there have also been 
other developments that deserve to be taken seriously, first and foremost the indication that 
his anti-Semitism informs not only his personal beliefs and political stance but is already 
rooted in his philosophy, notably his ontology. It is these developments and the context 
of Heidegger’s philosophy that are examined first, before I return to  the purported 
significance of his ideas for education towards the end of this essay.
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Heidegger and anti-Semitism
It is a well-known and much-publicised fact that Martin Heidegger was not only 
an opportunist Nazi sympathiser but also a  life-long anti-Semite who never 
apologised for his proclivities and actions during the Third Reich or renounced 
his anti-Jewish ideas or beliefs. After 1945, he never commented directly on 
the Holocaust but was concerned instead with downplaying his involvement with 
National Socialism in Germany. Although he became evidently disillusioned with 
the actual movement of National Socialism, with Nazism, coming to perceive it 
not as the new beginning he had initially anticipated but rather, after a while, as 
a species of technological nihilism, he never broke with some of its central ideas 
and biases.
Following the publication of Heidegger’s Einführung in die Metaphysik in 1953, 
Jürgen Habermas published an  intriguing proposal: to think with Heidegger 
against Heidegger (Habermas, 1953). In recent years, particularly in response 
to the phased appearance of Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte (Heidegger, 2014; 2015), 
a new development has taken place in Germany: articulation of the need to think 
without Heidegger. Although this turn of events has not come as much of a surprise, 
Heidegger scholarship has until recently been insistent on a strict separation 
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of the man and his œuvre. As Michael Inwood writes (1997, p. 129) in his short 
introduction to Heidegger: “What does [his entanglement with Nazism] tell us 
about his philosophy? And conversely, what does his philosophy tell us about it? 
Not much.” And when he assumes that “the ideas of [Being and Time] did not 
commit Heidegger to Nazism” (ibid, p. 130), it turns out that he may be quite wrong 
in both regards.
Before the publication of Heidegger’s notebooks1, it was his letters to his wife 
Elfride (Heidegger, 2008) and to his brother Fritz (now collected and annotated in: 
Homolka, Heidegger [eds.], 2016) that confirmed the German philosopher’s lasting 
anti-Semitism and ethnonationalism. In what follows, ‘anti-Semitism’ will be used 
to mean hostility towards or prejudice against Jews. It does not imply any rejection 
of the state of Israel or hostility towards the Israeli government – although these 
two attitudes often coincide. A corollary of this understanding is that one can be 
vehemently opposed to anti-Semitism without thereby endorsing the actions or 
policies of the Israeli government. That is to say, being critical of the government 
of Israel does not connote anti-Semitism. This is a distinction that, regrettably, 
is often not made – notably (and for obvious historical reasons) by the present 
German government. ‘Ethnonationalism’, in Heidegger’s case, means German 
ethnic nationalism. For Heidegger, whiteness (being white) is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for national (in this case German) identity. All Germans are 
white, in other words, but not all whites are German (Heidegger, 2014: Schwarze 
Hefte/Überlegungen III, section 195).
This ethnonationalism also has implications for philosophy. For Heidegger, 
the two truly philosophical languages are ancient Greek and German. Ancient 
Greek language and culture gave us the beginning of Western philosophy, while 
German language and culture gave us a new beginning that would re-root Western 
man. Heidegger’s anti-Jewish outlook and initial pro-Nazi sympathies (shared by 
Elfride, but not by Fritz) were never recanted. Heidegger’s actual involvement with 
Nazism may not have lasted very long, but his contributions included a program 
of Gleichschaltung, of cooptation or forcible-coordination, which aimed at bringing 
all aspects of German life, not least German academic life, into line with the ideals 
of the National Socialist state; the banning of Jewish student societies; introduction 
of proof of the Aryan certificate and fatigue duty; introduction of the Hitler salute 
at Freiburg university; the firing of academics on the basis of race membership; 
and withdrawal of teaching permission for Jewish lecturers. Unlike his “brief 
involvement or at least flirtation with Nazism” (Heil, 2011, p. 8), a relationship 
that received unequivocal articulation in his rectoral address on his investiture at 
the University of Freiburg in April 19332, his anti-Semitism was life-long.
 1 Heidegger referred to these as his “Denktagebuch”, a diary meant to track his thinking.
 2 Concerning Heidegger’s rectoral address on his investiture at the University of Freiburg, Die 
Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität (“The self-affirmation of the German university”; 
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On 17 October 1918, Heidegger writes to Elfride: “people have been systematically 
nauseated by pan-German pipe dreams […]. I myself recognize ever more urgently 
the necessity for leaders” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 55). In a lecture addressed to students 
at the beginning of the winter semester 1933–34, he articulates his confidence that 
the National Socialist revolution will bring on a “complete revolution of our German 
Dasein”: “You should not allow axioms and ideas to regulate your lives. The Führer, 
and he alone, is the present and future reality and law of Germany”3 (quoted 
in: Gerratana, 1977, p. 52; see also Vašek, 2014, p. 72). Equally chilling is a letter 
dated 18 October 1916 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 28): “The jewification of our culture & 
universities is certainly horrifying & I think the German race should summon 
up the inner strength to find its feet again”.4 On 20 August 1920 he comments, 
in anticipation of rising prices at the imminent harvest dance, that “the farmers 
are gradually getting insolent up here too & [that] everything’s swamped with 
Jews and black marketeers” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 77). In a letter to his brother Fritz 
dated 13 April 1933, Heidegger complains that the disappearance of three Jews from 
his university department, for reasons of the so-called Beamtengesetz (or public 
service law), will leave him having to do all the work (Homolka & Heidegger, 
2016, p. 35). After the end of the war (23 July 1945), he informs Fritz and his family 
that everything is worse than it was during the time of the Nazis: “Hier ist es 
wenig schön. Wir müssen KZ-Leute in die Wohnung aufnehmen”5 (Homolka, 
Heidegger, 2016, pp. 126–127). None of the letters to his wife and to his brother 
deal with the persecution of Jews during the Third Reich. The Schwarze Hefte, 
however, do contain references to terror, mass annihilation and concentration 
camps, albeit in terms of analogies that betray a staggering paucity of ethical and 
Heidegger, 1983), his former colleague Karl Jaspers (who was a professor of philosophy at 
the University of Heidelberg, before being dismissed by the regime in 1937 for having a Jewish 
wife) commented later: “In form it was the typical academic speech, but in its content it repre-
sented neither more nor less than a Nazi programme for university reform” (quoted in Trewhela, 
2008). Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism was unmissable even prior to his 
investiture: “(1) Nazi students filled Heidegger’s classes and enthusiastically clamoured around 
him; (2) Heidegger’s wife was an enthusiastic member of the party and supporter of national 
socialism; (3) at the Davos debate with [German Jewish philosopher] Ernst Cassirer in 1929, 
Nazi students supported Heidegger and shouted down Cassirer with slogans and insults; and 
(4) Heidegger’s lifestyle and thinking were sympathetic to fascist völkisch [folksy] ideology: he 
wore Bavarian peasant clothes and affected peasant manners; he spent as much time as possible 
in his mountain retreat in Todtnauberg; and he was becoming increasingly nationalistic and 
political in the 1930s.” (Kellner, 1984, pp. 406–407n.3/ch.4)
 3 “Nicht Lehrsätze und ‘Ideen’ seien die Regeln eures Seins. Der Führer selbst und allein ist 
die heutige und künftige Wirklichkeit und ihr Gesetz.” (Aufruf an die Deutschen Studenten. 
Freiburger Studentenzeitung; 3 November 1933)
 4 In the English translation of the letters, the ampersand has been used to replicate Heidegger’s 
use of “u.” (as an abbreviation of “und”).
 5 “It is hardly nice here at all. We have to put up concentration camp people.”
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political judgement. Thus, Heidegger (2015, p. 59) considers the “terror of ultimate 
nihilism” to be even more sinister than the “massiveness of executioners and KZ 
[concentration camps]”. He compares “the noise over the deaths of the many” 
to the fact that Leibniz has fallen into oblivion and that Nietzsche has been done 
wrong, the result being that standards or yardsticks have been lost in the evaluation 
and assessment of irresponsibility.
The  ‘new development’ to which I referred above resulted from the general 
realisation that it was not only a matter of personal opinion or political idiosyncrasy: 
Heidegger’s nationalism and racism arguably went even deeper.
Should we cease engaging with the ideas and texts of those who have been 
demonstrated, quite unequivocally, to have manifested prejudicial leanings and 
convictions? Gottlob Frege was a brilliant logician and philosopher of mathematics. 
He was also a well-known nationalist and anti-Semite. Yet, any dismissal of his 
contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics on the mere basis of his 
racist prejudices (that is, as opposed to being based on lack of philosophical rigour, 
coherence or plausibility) would involve an ad hominem fallacy. In the case of Frege 
(as in the case of Aristotle, an apologist of slavery), it is presumably advisable 
to draw a distinction between ‘person’ and ‘work’. With Heidegger, however, 
it is a different matter. Heidegger’s anti-Semitism arguably and demonstrably 
pervades his philosophy, notably his ontology (see, for example, Heidegger, 2001). 
Heidegger’s ethnonationalist prejudice (which is not mitigated by his four-year-
affair in the 1920s with his Jewish student Hannah Arendt6) is structural. This has 
led some (see, for example, Di Cesare, 2015; Heinz, 2015; Noll, 2016; Vašek, passim; 
see also Blum, 2014; Cammann & Soboczynski, 2016; Neiman, 2016; Probst, 2015, 
and the anthologies edited by Heinz and Kellerer, and by Homolka and Heidegger’s 
grandson Arnulf Heidegger, both 2016) to call for a more radically dismissive 
approach towards the philosopher.
Dasein
What is the substance of the claim that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is rooted in his 
ontology?
At the core of his philosophy is the  theme of being (Sein). Although it is 
the central if not the only philosophical question for Heidegger, it has–he asserts–
passed into oblivion. His endeavour is to discover the reasons for this oblivion 
of being, how it has taken place, where it has led us, and–importantly–how we can 
regain access to being. Dasein, ‘being there’, is a term employed by Heidegger in 
the investigation of human existence, that is, of the type of being humans have.7 
There is a distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘being’: of all that exists, it is humans 
 6 See also Ettinger, 1995.
 7 Dasein refers both to the (concrete) human being and to (abstract) human existence.
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who have characteristically always apprehended ‘being’, however vaguely. Human 
‘being’ is Dasein, ‘being there’, ‘in the world’. (This is the initial constitutive feature 
of human Dasein, its ‘facticity’.8) The world is conceived and conceptualised as 
structurally differentiated into regions. Heidegger refers to these fundamental 
structures of human Dasein as ‘existentials’ (Existenzialien, existential modalities 
and their modifications; broadly comparable to what Aristotle and Kant have referred 
to as ‘categories’9). Existence can be understood only through the description and 
analysis of human ‘being’, Dasein, the basic mode of being in the world through 
involvement and participation. The environment or surrounding world (Umwelt) is 
constituted of objects that are accessible and utilisable for purposive action. Action 
and knowledge are inseparably related. This consideration refers to a further feature 
of a human being’s Dasein, ‘existentiality’, the apprehension of her purposive being 
and potential.
Dasein is also community. The modifications of the social environment or 
communal world (Mitwelt) are the ‘authentic’ (eigentlich10 – ‘actual’, ‘essential’), 
unique being, recognisable and recognised among other human agents, and 
those who are merely present, who are mere (passive) existents, who constitute 
the conformist masses and banal averageness, with whom communication is not 
actually possible. ‘Inauthenticity’ refers to depersonalised mode of being, with no 
temporal significance other than that of sheer presence. This is intimately connected 
with a  third feature of Dasein, (what Heidegger calls) ‘fallenness’ (Verfallen, 
Verfallensein), the individual’s tendency to become lost in present preoccupations 
or to ‘fall prey to’ the average everyday roles imposed on her, forfeiting her unique 
possibilities and ‘authentic’ existence. Being there is not the  same as being 
conscious (as implied in Descartes’s cogito11): Dasein is the individual’s ability 
to exist in the world, determined by the choices she makes, including false or 
‘inauthentic’ ones.
Finally, Dasein is being-towards-death. This absolute limit gives rise to the actual 
significance and urgency of human Dasein: it asks each individual to live her life in 
freedom and responsibility. Death at once locates Dasein in time, makes it temporal/
finite (thereby giving it temporal significance), and gives rise to concern and care 
(Sorge). Sorge comprises the three characteristics of Dasein – facticity, existentiality 
and fallenness. A human being’s particular mode of being-in-the-world (see also 
 8 The notion ‘facticity’ is broadly similar to ‘factuality’, but it is reserved essentially for Dasein, 
i.e. the sheer fact that one is. 
 9 However, Dasein ‘exists’ (i.e., ‘stands forth’), creating its own ways of being, in a way that no 
other entity does. So, according to Heidegger, instead of speaking of ‘categories’, as we do when 
examining the being of other entities, we should speak rather of ‘existentials’, to mark the basic 
features of Dasein’s being.
 10 To be ‘authentic’ is to be true to one’s ‘own self ’, to be one’s own person, to do one’s own thing.
 11 As Yun has pointed out (2018, p. 215), the Cartesian notion of the human being is that of a body-
-independent mind that is also “abstracted from experience”. 
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Yun, 2018, pp. 214–215) is characterised by relatedness to surrounding objects and 
members of her community, in terms of being concerned with and caring about 
them. As Inwood notes (1997, p. 58), “the only entities that lack care, concern, and 
solicitude are those that are wholly incapable of them, such as trees, stones, and 
animals”.
Heidegger’s magnum opus is Being and Time (Heidegger, 2001). Published in 
1927, it is not an explicitly or overtly political work. Yet, in a sense, as his letters 
and especially his Schwarze Hefte reveal, he draws on the worst anti-Semitic clichés 
of his time and embeds these in the ontological vocabulary developed in the 1920s. 
Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is not ostensibly biologically based but ontohistorical. For 
him, Jews are not (in) Dasein, but only (in) ‘that which exists’ (das Seiende) – they 
are mere entities, merely present, mere passive existents, meaning they are not only 
‘inauthentic’ but, in fact, seinsvergessen (oblivious of being), which for Heidegger 
is objectionable. He perceives them in connection with wheelings and dealings 
(Machenschaften)12 that flatten, reckon up and exploit all that is (das Seiende; 
the being, the entity, what is, beings, entities) – and that progressively alienate us 
from being (Sein). According to him, Jews actively promote the abandonedness 
of being (Seinsverlassenheit) of the modern world, the uprootment of all that 
is present (das Seiende) from being (Sein). Heidegger’s thinking here assumes 
conspiracy-theoretical proportions: whether it is Jews or technology, Machenschaft 
is omnipresent, an omnipotent ontic destiny, an anonymous ‘will to power’. In 
the exploitation of all that exists, there is ultimately no difference between war 
and peace, only an all-out ‘onslaught’ (Angriff ) – in Heidegger’s overstrung 
apocalyptic diagnosis. Perhaps the argument might be made that Being and Time 
precedes the Schwarze Hefte and that, therefore, a distinction between Heidegger 
the philosopher and Heidegger the person is not only possible but mandatory. 
However, it is well-documented that his anti-Semitism was already firmly in place 
before he wrote Being and Time, and it is difficult reading the work today without 
bearing in mind the connotations of some of his ontological vocabulary that later 
became so glaringly and painfully obvious.
Heidegger and philosophy of education
Perhaps, at this juncture, I might be forgiven a personal confession: I find it very 
difficult to work up any degree of enthusiasm for Heidegger’s philosophy. I cannot 
endorse his somewhat immodest appraisal of his own substantial contribution 
in this regard (in a  letter dated 1 July 1916 he refers to his “philosophical gift”; 
Heidegger, 2008, p. 22). It seems to consist in the main of highly artificial and 
 12 This is already indicated in the aforementioned letter to Elfride on 20 August 1920 (Heidegger, 
2008, p. 77).
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contrived Geschwurbel (educated babble)13, of bald assertions and verbal arbitra-
tion. He does not provide argumentation so much as seek to ‘reveal’: so perhaps 
his philosophy is, rather, a kind of ontomysticism that evades the thrust-and-parry 
of rational, scholarly disputation. Heidegger commonly seems to elevate etymolo-
gical nitpicking and wordplay to the status of philosophy. His dismissal, in a letter 
to Elfride on Whit Sunday 1917, of Edmund Husserl’s “narrow & bloodless … 
phenomenology” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 33) could just as easily be directed towards 
his own style of thinking and manner of articulation. From one particular per-
spective, his disdain for axioms and the basic rules of propositional logic and for 
the perfectly rational requirements that valid arguments must adhere to a certain 
form and that sound arguments must in addition satisfy certain criteria in terms 
of content renders his ideas unassailable. From a less charitable perspective, howe-
ver, his Vernunftkritik comes across as the narcissistic reaction of someone whose 
rampant speculations would be held in check by critical, logical examination and 
interrogation. I suspect that fairly little would remain if one were to eliminate all 
invalid and unsound reasoning and all outlandish etymological testimony from 
Heidegger’s writings.
I also struggle to see his relevance to philosophy of education14 that many have 
attested to, especially in recent years. Thus, in 2009 Michael Peters commented 
in an editorial dedicated to the significance of Heidegger’s phenomenology for 
philosophy of education: “Heidegger and his forms of phenomenology have been 
a neglected figure in the field of philosophy of education in the English-speaking 
world. Little has been written on Heidegger or about his work and its significance 
for educational thought and practice.” (Peters 2009, p. 1)
This has certainly changed in recent years, Heidegger’s ontology and 
phenomenology being drawn on by Gloria Dall’Alba in her discussion 
of “professional ways of being” (Dall’Alba, 2009), Angus Brook in his account 
of coming to terms with becoming a teacher (Brook, 2009), Vasco D’Agnese in his 
discussion of truth as disclosure via education (D’Agnese, 2015) and of the ethics 
of teaching (D’Agnese, 2016; see also Lewis, 2017), SunInn Yun’s analysis of time 
as a resource in education, as well as education as an existential event (Yun, 2018), 
and in discussions of the different possibilities of thinking in education (Bonnett, 
1994; Lewin, 2015; Peters, 2007; Standish, 1992; Siegel, 201715; Williams, 2013; 2015). 
 13 A case in point is the near-incomprehensible (and almost certainly untranslatable) formula-
tion of the “Schied als der fügenden Fuge der äußersten Freye zur Innigkeit des Selben Selber” 
(Heidegger, 2015). This is reminiscent of Lewis Carroll’s Jabberwocky – albeit without the humour.
 14 I concede, however, that the letters that deal with the politics of academia, both during and after 
the Third Reich, make for fascinating reading; see Heidegger, 2008.
 15 In order to pre-empt any misunderstanding, it must be pointed out in this regard that Harvey 
Siegel does not pretend to be a Heidegger scholar. Indeed, he confesses to a “lack of familiarity 
with and understanding of Heidegger”. In his article, he merely responds to Emma Williams’s 
(2015) concern that Siegel’s account of critical thinking is excessively tied to epistemology, and 
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However, it should also be noted that Heidegger seems to understand infancy and 
childhood as a “privation of adulthood, by contrast with our fully fledged Dasein” 
(Inwood, 1997, p. 21). This clearly indicates a deficit conception of infancy and 
childhood, as something to get through and leave behind, as phases of development 
that exist only in instrumental terms of preparation for adult life, rather than 
being valuable and cherishable in and for themselves. Heidegger does not appear 
to have been very interested in education. There is very little in his work that relates 
to education, pedagogy, and child-rearing, and it would appear that it “serves more 
as an inspiration in rethinking the role and goal of education.” (Yosef-Hassidim, 
2014, p. 434) In other words, it contains no philosophy of education. For better or 
worse, it allows for unrestrained interpretation and extrapolation.
A possible exception may be the following passage from Heidegger’s book What 
is called thinking?: “Teaching is more difficult than learning. We know that; but 
we rarely think about it. And why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not 
because the teacher must have a larger store of information, and have it always ready. 
Teaching is even more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: 
to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing else be learned than – learning. 
His conduct therefore often produces the  impressions that we properly learn 
nothing from him, if by learning we now suddenly understand the procurement 
of useful information. The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that 
he has still more to learn than they – he has to learn to let them learn. The teacher 
must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far 
less assured of his ground than those who learn are of theirs. If the relationship 
between the teacher and the taught is genuine, therefore, there is never a place in 
it for the know-it-all or the authoritative sway of the official. It is still an exalted 
matter, then, to become a teacher.” (Heidegger, 1968, pp. 15–16)
The ‘argument’, then, that Heidegger provides is the following: Teaching involves 
letting learn, and indeed learning to let learn. Because of this, teaching is more 
difficult than learning. Therefore, to become a (“real”) teacher is an exalted matter. 
But is the initial premise correct? And how does one get from the first assertion 
to the assertion that marks the sub-conclusion here? What constitutes the essence 
of teaching that allows learning to take place? What compliance or collusion on 
the part of the teacher does such teaching involve? How might conditions be 
established that are conducive to ‘letting learn’? Heidegger does not elaborate on 
any of these matters. Must teachers be prepared to remain silent, and thus curb 
their inclinations to pass on their knowledge, information and ideas that have 
excited and continue to excite them? (It is not at all clear whether Heidegger heeded 
his own advice.) Finally, the notion of becoming a (real) teacher being “an exalted 
to her argument that the work of Heidegger, for example, can be employed “in the development 
of a deeper, richer, ‘radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks’ 
[Williams 2015, p. 142]” (Siegel, 2017, pp. 193–194).
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matter” remains unexplained and thus, too, a mere assertion. The deliberately 
nebulous and ambiguous nature of many of Heidegger’s ideas16 allows for all 
kinds of interpretation and extrapolation – which may help explain why so many 
philosophers of education claim to find in his work inspiration for rethinking 
the role(s) and goal(s) of education. There are many thinkers, philosophers other 
than Heidegger, who have expressed thoughts and ideas that are at once more 
immediately valuable, more obviously relevant to education, pedagogy, and child-
rearing, and considerably less banal.
My own misgivings about Heidegger’s philosophical and educational significance 
notwithstanding, the proposal to think without Heidegger arguably constitutes 
advocacy of  a kind of  censorship that has no natural home in democratic, 
open-minded discourse. My counter-proposal is to embark on a much more 
critical approach to Heidegger (especially within English-language philosophy 
of education), and to re-think his purported contribution and relevance in the light 
of his ominous political and, indeed, philosophical leanings. 
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MYŚLENIE BEZ HEIDEGGERA?
Streszczenie: W ostatnich latach nastąpiło odrodzenie zainteresowania myślą Martina 
Heideggera, zwłaszcza w anglojęzycznej filozofii wychowania. Jednak były też inne wy-
darzenia, które zasługują na poważne potraktowanie, przede wszystkim wykazujące, że 
jego antysemityzm informuje nie tylko o jego osobistych przekonaniach i stanowisku 
politycznym, ale jest głęboko zakorzeniony w jego filozofii, zwłaszcza w ontologii. To 
właśnie te zmiany i kontekst filozofii Heideggera zostaną zbadane na początku niniej-
szego artykułu. Następnie autor odniesie się do rzekomego przełomowego znaczenia jego 
spojrzenia na wychowanie.
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